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ABSTRACT
During the 2013 North Dakota Legislative Session, the issue of
compensability for a pre-existing condition and acceleration of pain
symptoms was considered in response to a 2012 North Dakota Supreme
Court decision in Mickelson v. North Dakota Workforce Safety and
Insurance. This Article will primarily provide an overview of the
Mickelson decision, the legislative response to the decision, and the current
state of the law in this specific area.
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INTRODUCTION

Workforce Safety & Insurance (“WSI”) is North Dakota’s exclusive
workers' compensation insurance provider. It is an executive branch agency
that administers benefits to those injured on the job, and collects premiums
from employers conducting business in North Dakota to fund this statutory
benefit structure. WSI is entirely funded from employer premium dollars
and receives no state general funds.
As the only workers’ compensation insurance carrier in North Dakota,
employers conducting business in North Dakota are required to obtain
workers’ compensation insurance from WSI, with few exceptions. North
Dakota has had a monopolistic workers compensation system since 1919
when it was first created by the North Dakota Legislature.1 North Dakota
workers’ compensation law is contained in chapter 65 of the North Dakota
Century Code (the “Century Code”).2 WSI decisions regarding benefits
paid and premiums received are subject to the Administrative Agencies
Practices Act found in chapter 28-32 of the Century Code.3
Pursuant to chapter 28-32, a WSI decision can be appealed and heard
by an independent administrative law judge, whose decision is subject to
review by the North Dakota State District and Supreme Court.4 While
judicial appeals regarding workers compensation issues are common, some
decisions have a wider impact and generate more public attention. One of
these decisions, rendered in 2012 by the North Dakota Supreme Court, was
at the heart of a debate in the 2013 North Dakota Legislative Assembly.
On August 16, 2012, the North Dakota Supreme Court filed the
plurality opinion of Mickelson v. North Dakota Workforce Safety and
Insurance.5 In this case, the Court was faced with interpreting North
Dakota workers’ compensation statutes governing compensability of
diseases, injuries, or other medical conditions which accompany an
employee to his or her workplace and exist prior to a workplace injury
(commonly referred to as preexisting conditions). Reactions to the differing
opinions in Mickelson have been diverse and intense, prompting legislators
to introduce legislation in response to Mickelson’s plurality opinion.

1.
2.
3.
4.
5.

H.B. 56, 16th Leg. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (N.D. 1919).
N.D. CENT. CODE ch. 65-01 (2013).
See N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 28-32-01, 02 (2013).
N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 28-32-42, 49 (2013).
2012 ND 164, 820 N.W.2d 333.
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II. WORKERS COMPENSATION LAW REGARDING
COMPENSABILITY OF CONDITIONS PRESENT PRIOR TO A
WORKPLACE INJURY
In general, only those injuries caused by an employee’s work are
covered injuries under North Dakota workers’ compensation law. This
largely distinguishes WSI from other health care insurers as causation is
rarely determinative of coverage under general health insurance policies.
Section 65-01-02(10) of the Century Code defines a “compensable
injury” as “an injury by accident arising out of and in the course of
hazardous employment which must be established by medical evidence
supported by objective medical findings.”6 As a result, when a claim for
workers’ compensation benefits is filed by an injured employee, the
threshold inquiry is whether the injury is truly an industrial accident as
defined in section 65-01-02(10).
There are times when an industrial accident occurs which may impact
an employee's pre-existing, non-work related injury, disease, or condition.
For example, an employee for a local home improvement store has had
degenerative disc disease of the lumbar spine for years. One day while at
work, the employee has an accident while lifting a box. She reports an
injury to the same area of her lumbar spine where the disease process has
been advancing. The employee files a claim for benefits with WSI and is in
need of ongoing medical treatment. Because there was a non-work related
disease process already present in the employee’s lumbar spine and WSI
only covers injuries caused by an employee’s work, WSI must further
explore the underlying condition in its compensability analysis.
Section 65-01-02(10)(b)(7) of the Century Code provides specific
guidance when determining whether an injured employee is entitled to
workers' compensation benefits in claims involving preexisting injury,
disease, or other conditions. Until 2013, this provision stated the term
“compensable injury” did not include, “[i]njuries attributable to a
preexisting injury, disease, or other condition, including when the
employment acts as a trigger to produce symptoms in the preexisting injury,
disease, or other condition unless the employment substantially accelerates
its progression or substantially worsens its severity.”7
The 2013 Legislative Assembly added the following clarifying
sentence to section 65-01-02(10)(b)(7): “Pain is a symptom and may be
considered in determining whether there is a substantial acceleration or
substantial worsening of a preexisting injury, disease, or other condition,
6. N.D. CENT. CODE § 65-01-02(10) (2013) (emphasis added).
7. N.D. CENT. CODE § 65-01-02(10)(b)(7) (2011).
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but pain alone is not a substantial acceleration or a substantial
worsening.”8 As a result, compensability requires the industrial accident to
in some way act upon the underlying preexisting condition and substantially
accelerate the progression or substantially worsen the severity of the
underlying condition. Under WSI’s interpretation of this statute, a trigger
symptom, such as pain, in the underlying condition is not sufficient to
render the condition compensable.
The more challenging workers compensation claims to adjudicate
involve preexisting conditions. In these claims, WSI must conduct a deeper
analysis of the underlying condition and determine the impact, if any, of the
work incident on the condition. Specifically, WSI must analyze the cause
of the complaints associated with a claimed injury to ascertain the diagnosis
of the condition that is causing the symptoms. Then WSI must determine
whether this condition meets the definition of a compensable injury.
A. HISTORY OF THE INTERACTION BETWEEN THE PREEXISTING
INJURY STATUTE AND THE AGGRAVATION STATUTE
The preexisting injury statute has evolved over time. In fact, prior to
the 1997 and 2013 amendments, section 65-01-02(10)(b)(7) excluded the
following from the definition of “compensable injury”:
Injuries attributable to a preexisting injury, disease, or condition
which clearly manifested itself prior to the compensable injury.
This does not prevent compensation where employment
substantially aggravates and acts upon an underlying condition,
substantially worsening its severity, or where employment
substantially accelerates the progression of an underlying
condition. It is insufficient, however, to afford compensation
under this title solely because the employment acted as a trigger to
produce symptoms in a latent and underlying condition if the
underlying condition would likely have progressed similarly in the
absence of the employment trigger, unless the employment trigger
is determined to be a substantial aggravating or accelerating factor.
An underlying condition is a preexisting injury, disease, or
infirmity.9
North Dakota also has what is commonly referred to as an aggravation
statute.10 A version of this statute has been in place since 1931.11 This
8. Id. (emphasis added).
9. N.D. CENT. CODE § 65-01-02(10)(b)(7) (1995).
10. N.D. CENT. CODE § 65-05-15 (2013).
11. H.B. 209, 23d Leg. Sess. (N.D. 1931).
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statute operates to award benefits on a reduced level when a known
preexisting condition created “an interference with physical function” or
“has caused previous work restriction.”12 In other words, when applied,
benefits are paid on a partial basis rather than in full. Benefits are paid in
full for the acute period, but thereafter, at a percentage equal to the
percentage of the cause of the resulting medical condition that can be
attributable to the work injury.13 Currently there is a presumption that fifty
percent of the resulting condition is attributable to the work injury.14
It is important to understand that neither the preexisting condition
statute, nor the aggravation statute operate independently. These two
statutes interact, and, as a result, are dependent upon the interpretations of
each other. Their applications stack, one upon the other. The resulting
complexity in application therefore compounds.
Under the pre-1997 statutes, in order for a claim involving preexisting
conditions to be accepted, employment must have substantially aggravated
the underlying condition, substantially worsening its severity, or
substantially accelerated the progression of an underlying condition.15 If
the preexisting condition was latent, it had to be shown that the underlying
condition would likely have progressed similarly in the absence of the
employment trigger unless the employment trigger was determined to be a
substantial aggravating or accelerating factor.16 If this test was met, the
aggravation statute could then be considered.
At the same time, the version of the aggravation statute in effect prior
to its 1997 amendments provided that a “preexisting condition” meant
“disability or impairment known in advance of the work injury.”17 This
statute could be invoked if the preexisting condition was “active at the time
of the work injury, evidenced by work restriction (active disability) or
interference with function (active impairment).”18 In other words, it was
only applicable when the preexisting condition was “active.” It was then
only applicable after the injury was accepted under section 65-0102(10)(b)(7).
This statutory scheme had become, for all practical purposes,
unworkable. Each statute spoke to known or unknown preexisting
conditions. One required a showing that the condition would have
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.

N.D. CENT. CODE § 65-05-15(1) (2013).
N.D. CENT. CODE § 65-05-15(3) (2013).
Id.
N.D. CENT. CODE § 65-01-02(10)(b)(6) (1995).
Id.
N.D. CENT. CODE § 65-05-15(1) (1995).
N.D. CENT. CODE § 65-05-15(1) (1995).

486

NORTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 89:481

progressed similarly, but only if it was latent, and the other created
application if patent but then only if active. Depending on the reader's
view, each statute could easily yield slightly differing permutations.
Following the 1997 amendments to the preexisting injury and
aggravation statutes, the language in each of the statutes became parallel,
and all references to latent injuries were removed from the preexisting
injury statute.19 Differentiation of “latency” versus “patency” was an
analysis conducted under the aggravation statute, and only went to control
the size of the award, not whether a claim was compensable.20 References
to latent injuries requiring a showing they “would likely have progressed
similarly in the absence of the employment trigger, unless the employment
trigger is determined to be a substantial aggravating or accelerating factor”
were stripped from the statute. This was the 1997 North Dakota Legislative
Assembly’s response to clarify and remedy these unmanageable
complexities.
Particularly since the 1997 amendments, it has been WSI's
interpretation that a substantial acceleration or substantial worsening must
be measured against the underlying condition, and not against the
symptoms exhibited.
If symptoms, such as pain, can satisfy the
“substantially accelerates its progression or substantially worsens its
severity” test for preexisting diseases or conditions, taken to its logical
conclusion, even minimal increases in symptoms in a preexisting condition
could present a potentially compensable event. This is not what the 1997
Legislative Assembly intended. To do so would broaden the compensable
injury definition to the point that WSI would essentially become a general
medical insurer so long as the symptom arose at work. This would mark a
departure to the requirement that an injury is one "arising out of and in the
course of hazardous employment."21
B. THE MICKELSON OPINION
In Mickelson, the plurality’s analysis and conclusions brought into
question WSI's historical interpretation of section 65-01-02(10)(b)(7) of the
Century Code Code, seemingly reintroducing the “latent” versus “patent”
distinction in the compensability analysis and suggesting that pain in and of

19. N.D. CENT. CODE § 65-01-02(10)(b)(7) (1997).
20. N.D. CENT. CODE § 65-05-15(3) (1997).
21. N.D. CENT. CODE § 65-01-02(10) (2013).

2013]

LEGISLATIVE RESPONSE TO MICKELSON

487

itself could be a substantial acceleration or a substantial progression of a
preexisting non-work related condition.22
James Mickelson applied for workers’ compensation benefits, asserting
he “developed soreness in lower back due to repetitive motion over time
using foot pedal and driving over rough terrain.”23 WSI denied his claim
for benefits, stating the “January 2010 MRI revealed preexisting
degenerative conditions or arthritis and concluding his ‘one month
employment with Gratech triggered symptoms of [his] pre-existing
degeneration but did not cause the condition and [he] did not report an
injury to Gratech until’” Decemeber 14, 2009.24
A WSI medical consultant conducted a medical records review and
concluded that “Mickelson’s condition of ‘lumbar degenerative disc disease
[was] not caused by his reported work injury. Repetitive motion on rough
ground while operating a loader may trigger symptoms associated with
lumbar degenerative disc disease, but not cause, substantially worsen, or
substantially accelerate the condition.’”25 The WSI medical consultant
determined Mickelson had “not proven that his work activities substantially
accelerated the progression of or substantially worsened the severity of his
lumbar spine condition.”26
The case was appealed. Following an administrative hearing, the
Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) concluded the record failed to establish
Mickelson had “suffered a compensable injury during the course of his
employment.”27 The ALJ analyzed and weighed the conflicting medical
opinions of Dr. Peterson and Mr. Mickelson’s medical providers, and
ultimately gave more weight to Dr. Peterson’s opinion.28 In reaching a final
conclusion, the ALJ reasoned that “Mickelson's employment triggered his
symptoms of degenerative disc disease, but there was no evidence his
employment substantially accelerated the progression or substantially
worsened the severity of the degenerative disc disease.”29 The ALJ
explained that if Mickelson’s argument were accepted and the production of
symptoms constitutes a substantial worsening of his degenerative disc
disease, the “trigger” language of section 65-01-02(10)(b)(7) would become
meaningless.30
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.

Mickelson v. N.D. Workforce Safety & Ins., 2012 ND 164, ¶ 21, 820 N.W.2d 333, 342.
Id. ¶ 2, 820 N.W.2d at 336.
Id. ¶ 5, 820 N.W.2d at 337.
Id. ¶ 5, 820 N.W.2d at 337.
Id. ¶ 5, 820 N.W.2d at 337.
Id. ¶ 6, 820 N.W.2d at 337.
Id. ¶ 5, 820 N.W.2d at 337.
Id. ¶ 6, 820 N.W.2d at 337.
Id. ¶ 6, 820 N.W.2d at 337.
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Justice Kapsner, in authoring the plurality opinion for the court,
extensively referenced both Geck v. North Dakota Workers Compensation
Bureau,31 and Pleinis v. North Dakota Workers Compensation Bureau,32 as
guidance in interpreting the current version of section 65-01-02(10)(b)(7).33
These cases interpreted the pre-1997 versions of the statute. The plurality
also relied upon legislative testimony provided by a WSI representative in
1997 to support their assertion the 1997 amendments to the statute were
minimal:
[T]he 1997 amendment ‘did not significantly change the
substance’ of the definition of compensable injury; rather, the
amendment ‘removes unnecessary and confusing language. It also
adopts language that better matches the language of the
aggravation statute at 65-05-15. This will create a more workable
progression of compensation with no gaps between the various
statutes. If the workplace incident is a ‘mere trigger’ of a
preexisting condition then there is no coverage. If the work injury
significantly aggravates a known preexisting condition then there
is a partial coverage. If the work injury is not really affected by
the presence of the preexisting condition then it is a ‘new and
separate’ injury and is covered at 100% of benefits.”34
In concluding, Justice Kapnser recognized that an increase in pain
alone can support a compensable injury under the current version of the
statute:
We recognize . . . that pain can be a symptom, or subjective
evidence, of an injury, disease or other condition. Under the
ordinary meaning of those terms, however, employment can also
substantially worsen the severity, or substantially accelerate the
progression of a preexisting injury, disease, or other condition
when employment acts as a substantial contributing factor to
substantially increase a claimant's pain.35
Moreover, the plurality seems to reinstate the “latent” versus “patent”
distinction into section 65-01-02(10)(b)(7):

31. 1998 ND 158, 583 N.W.2d 621.
32. 472 N.W.2d 459 (N.D. 1991).
33. Mickelson, 2012 ND 164, ¶¶ 14-21, 820 N.W.2d at 339-42.
34. Id. ¶ 17, 820 N.W.2d at 340-41 (quoting Hearing on H.B. 1269 Before the H. Comm. on
Indus., Bus. and Labor, 55th Leg. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (N.D. 1997) (written testimony of Reagan
R. Pufall, WSI Attorney)).
35. Id. ¶ 20, 820 N.W.2d at 342.
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We decline to construe those terms so narrowly as to require only
evidence of a substantial worsening of the disease itself to
authorize an award of benefits. Rather, the statute also authorizes
compensability if employment substantially accelerates the
progression or substantially worsens the severity of the injury,
disease, or other condition, which we conclude requires
consideration of whether the preexisting injury, disease or other
condition would have progressed similarly in the absence of
employment. Under that language, employment substantially
accelerates the progression or substantially worsens the severity of
a preexisting injury, disease, or other condition when the
underlying condition likely would not have progressed similarly in
the absence of employment.
That interpretation provides
additional clarification and explanation for delineating between
noncompensability when employment triggers symptoms in a
preexisting latent injury, disease, or other condition and
compensability when employment substantially accelerates the
progression or substantially worsens the severity of the preexisting
injury, disease, or other condition.36
Interestingly, Justice Kapsner does not quote all of Attorney Reagan R.
Pufall’s written testimony on the preexisting condition statute when
appearing before the North Dakota Industry, Business and Labor
Committee in its deliberation of the 1997 changes to the statute. The
paragraph that was not included explains the preexisting injury statute as
follows:
This is sometimes referred to as the ‘trigger’ statute. Under
current law, if a worker has a preexisting injury, disease, or other
condition, known or unknown, that is ‘triggered’ by a minor
workplace incident, that is not considered a true work-related
injury, and is not compensable. A workplace incident that is only
‘the straw that broke the camel's back’ is not considered a work
injury. For example, if a worker has a degenerative condition that
is getting progressively worse, and it so happens that the condition
takes a turn for the worse at work, that will not be compensable.
However, if there was a workplace injury that substantially
accelerated the worsening of the condition, so that it got worse
much more quickly than it would have otherwise, or if there was a
workplace injury that did substantial additional damage on top of

36. Id. ¶ 21, 820 N.W.2d at 342 (emphasis added).
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the degenerative condition, making the result much more severe
than otherwise would have been, then that will be compensable. It
will either be accepted for full benefits or partial benefits,
depending on all the circumstances.37
Exactly as this testimony supports, the bill was intended to remove the
confusing language from the statute. Explicitly removed was the language
regarding known and unknown preexisting conditions. That differentiator
is now only contained within the “aggravation” statute.38
Justice Kapsner took special attention to reverse on legal grounds
stating:
We conclude the ALJ misapplied the law by looking too narrowly
at Mickelson’s degenerative disc disease itself without considering
whether his injury, disease, or other condition would likely not
have progressed similarly in the absence of his employment so as
to substantially accelerate the progression or substantially worsen
the severity of his injury, disease, or other condition. We therefore
reverse the judgment and remand for proper application of
N.D.C.C. § 65-01-02(10)(b)(7).39
Justice Kapsner’s opinion was signed by Justice Maring.40
Chief Justice VandeWalle wrote a specially concurring opinion. The
Chief Justice allowed the remand to occur: “[t]o the extent that is a factual,
rather than a legal question, I am willing to remand the matter to WSI for
further consideration under the facts of this case.”41 The Chief Justice
wrote:
While I agree with that conclusion, I am disturbed by the failure of
the statutes and our opinions construing those statutes to
distinguish those instances in which pain aggravates an underlying
condition, i.e., substantially worsens the severity of the condition,
from those instances in which, as the majority opinion here
recognizes, pain is only a symptom of the condition triggered by
employment.42

37. Hearing on H.B. 1269 Before the H. Comm. on Indus., Bus., and Labor, 55th Leg.
Assemb., Reg. Sess. (N.D. 1997) (written testimony of Reagan R. Pufall, WSI Attorney).
38. N.D. CENT. CODE § 65-05-15 (2013).
39. Mickelson, 2012 ND 164, ¶ 23, 820 N.W.2d at 344.
40. Id. ¶ 29, 820 N.W.2d at 345.
41. Id. ¶ 30, 820 N.W.2d at 345 (VandeWalle, C.J., concurring specially (emphasis added)).
42. Id. ¶ 30, 820 N.W.2d at 345.
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As a result, the plurality appears in disagreement as to the posture to which
the case was returned. Two justices assert it is returned on a legal basis, the
other on factual grounds.
Writing separately, concurring and dissenting in part, Justice Crothers
directs the Court’s attention to the statute as it is currently written.43
Specifically, Justice Crothers summarized Mickelson’s argument as being
“substantially based on a law review article written by his lawyer and on a
general Workers' Compensation treatise.”44 “The majority does not follow
Mickelson down that path, but spends considerable effort parsing the
meaning of ‘symptom,’ ‘substantially’ and ‘trigger’ and applying two of
this Court’s decisions issued before section 65-01-02(10) of the Century
Code Code was changed in 1997."45
Moreover, in his concurrence, Justice Crothers analyzed Justice
Kapsner’s opinion as follows:
Rather than affirming the ALJ’s straightforward application of the
statute, the majority opinion seemingly grinds the meaning of
ordinary words to powder and reshapes them to say ‘a preexisting
injury, disease, or other condition are compensable if the
employment in some real, true, important, or essential way makes
the preexisting injury, disease or other condition more
unfavorable, difficult, unpleasant, or painful, or in some real, true,
important, or essential way hastens the progress or development of
the preexisting injury, disease, or other condition.’
After
reshaping, the statute is read by the majority to say ‘pain can be a
substantial aggravation of an underlying latent condition,’ and
‘employment substantially accelerates the progression or
substantially worsens the severity of a preexisting injury, disease,
or other condition when the underlying condition likely would not
have progressed similarly in the absence of employment.’ In
simple terms, the majority holding appears to be that pain caused
by current employment can be a compensable injury because it
made an existing condition more ‘unfavorable,’ ‘difficult’ or
‘unpleasant.’ But clearly, that is not what the legislature said or
meant in N.D.C.C. § 65-01-02(10)(b)(7).46
His opinion was signed by Justice Sandstrom.47

43.
44.
45.
46.
47.

Id. ¶ 35, 820 N.W.2d at 346 (Crothers, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
Id. ¶ 34, 820 N.W.2d at 345.
Id. ¶ 34, 820 N.W.2d at 345.
Id. ¶ 36, 820 N.W.2d at 346 (internal citations omitted).
Id. ¶ 41, 820 N.W.2d at 348.
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Because of the fractured opinions, there was no majority in this
instance; rather a plurality of the Court remanded it on two distinctly
different bases. Because of the plurality's deviation from WSI's historical
application of the preexisting statute, a response from the 2013 Legislative
Assembly was generated.
C. LEGISLATIVE RESPONSE TO MICKELSON
On January 10, 2013, Representative George Keiser and Senator Jerry
Klein introduced House Bill No. 1163 (“HB 1163”) to the House of
Representatives.48 The purpose was to amend section 65-01-02(10)(b)(7) to
include the language, “[p]ain is a symptom and is not a substantial
acceleration or substantial worsening of a preexisting injury, disease, or
other condition.”49 The House referred it to the House Industry, Business,
and Labor Committee for consideration.
During the Committee hearing on HB 1163 held on January 21, 2013,
the Committee heard from proponents and opponents of the bill. Mr. Tim
Wahlin, Chief of Injury Services at WSI, provided WSI’s perspective:
WSI, as did the Administrative Law Judge in this case, has read
the statute to require a substantial worsening or progression in the
preexisting condition, not just symptoms.50 To conclude a
worsening has occurred because there is pain, or that the pain itself
is a new compensable condition, essentially renders the statute
moot.51
Mr. Wahlin further provided that if HB 1163 failed, the financial impact
could cause premiums rates to increase from 5.5% to 12.6%.52
Mr. Dean Haas, the attorney who represented Mr. Mickelson, provided
the main opposition testimony to HB 1163.53 Mr. Haas categorized HB
1163 as a “dire change,”54 stating it “would deny that pain can show a
significant worsening of the preexisting condition, and reverse the decisions

48. H.B. 1163, 63d Leg. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (N.D. 2013).
49. Id. (Introduced version 13.0220.02000), http://www.legis nd.gov/assembly/63-2013/
documents/13-0220-02000.pdf.
50. While there were others who testified in both support and opposition of H.B. 1163, this
article contains selected testimony that is intended to capture the essence of the arguments
presented on both sides.
51. Hearing on H.B. 1163 Before the H. Comm. on Indus., Bus., and Labor, 63rd Leg.
Assemb., Reg. Sess. 51 (N.D. 2013) [hereinafter House Hearing on H.B. 1163] (statement of Tim
Wahlin, Chief of Injury Services, WSI).
52. Id. at 4.
53. Id. at 7. (statement of Attorney Dean Haas).
54. Id.
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of the North Dakota Supreme Court.”55 He indicated the bill was “a
severely retrograde step” and should be studied by the legislature prior to its
enactment.56 Mr. Haas asserted the Geck case, which noted pain could be
an aggravation of an underlying condition of arthritis under previous law,
was still controlling law, and Mickelson reaffirmed this.57 This position
was refuted by WSI’s testimony regarding WSI’s historical application.58
On January 23, 2013, the Industry, Business, and Labor Committee met
and reviewed a fiscal note provided by WSI.59 In addition, as suggested by
Mr. Haas, Representative Marvin Nelson moved a “hog house
amendment”60 to require the 2013-14 Interim Workers' Compensation
Review Committee to study coverage of the worsening of conditions.61
This motion failed four to eleven. Representative Gary Sukut moved to
pass HB 1163 in its original form, which passed eleven to four. 62
HB 1163 returned to the floor of the House of Representatives for a
second reading on January 29, 2013, where it passed sixty-one to twentyeight.63 On January 30, 2013, the Senate received the bill from the House
of Representatives. It was not formally introduced into the Senate until
February 12, 2013, and once again referred to the Industry, Business and
Labor Committee.64
The Senate Industry, Business and Labor Committee met on March 19,
2013.65 During this hearing, robust and diverse testimony on HB 1163 took
place. Initially, Representative George Keiser introduced HB 1163 to the
Committee, referencing the Mickelson decision and the need for the bill.66

55. Id. at 70 (statement of Attorney Dean Haas).
56. Id. at 71.
57. Id. at 72; see also Geck v. N.D. Workers Comp. Bureau, 1998 ND 158, ¶¶ 10-15, 583
N.W.2d 621, 624 (noting that a compensable aggravation of a pre-existing arthritis could include a
worsening of symptoms and remanded to the case to determine whether there was a substantial
aggravation of the arthritis in plaintiff's left knee).
58. House Hearing on H.B. 1163, supra note 52, at 51 (statement of Tim Wahlin, Chief of
Injury Services, WSI).
59. WSI provided a summary of Actuarial Information to the Legislative Council stating no
fiscal impact was anticipated with the proposed bill because there would not be a change to WSI's
application of the statute. Hearing on H.B. 1163 Before the S. Comm. on Indus., Bus., and Labor,
63rd Leg. Assemb., Reg. Sess. 78 (N.D. 2013) [hereinafter Senate Hearing on H.B. 1163].
60. A “Hog House” amendment can typically be described as a removal of the entirety of a
bill's legislative text and replacement via amendment. See, e.g., SOUTH DAKOTA LEGISLATURE'S
STUDENT GUIDE: GLOSSARY OF LEGISLATIVE TERMS, 4, available at http://legis.sd.gov/docs/
studentspage/studentguide/Glossary.pdf.
61. House Hearing on H.B. 1163, supra note 52, at 12 (statement of Representative Nelson).
62. Id. at 13 (statement of Representative Sukut).
63. H. JOURNAL, 63d Leg. Assemb., Reg. Sess. 261, 262-63 (N.D. 2013).
64. S. JOURNAL, 63d Leg. Assemb., Reg. Sess. 323, 346 (N.D. 2013).
65. Senate Hearing on H.B. 1163, supra note 60.
66. See id. at 21 (statement of Representative George Keiser).
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He stated that “in the interim, the court intervened and made a ruling in
contradiction to what the practice had been at [WSI].”67
At this time, Tim Wahlin again testified on behalf of WSI.68 He
initially addressed the misinformation circulating about HB 1163:
We have met with various constituents to explain why this bill was
submitted and what is intended by the language. There are various
interpretations regarding the bills effects and intentions in
circulation and we acknowledge that fact. I have attached a one
page information sheet to provide clarification. Many of the issues
within this bill illustrate profound ideological differences within
the workers’ compensation industry. Hopefully this testimony will
help to explain the reasons behind the bill’s creation and facilitate
a discussion regarding a reasonable balancing of the potential
increased scope of coverage and the costs this may generate.69
He explained WSI’s practice of focusing on the compensability of the
underlying condition in order to determine compensability.70 He further
stated that HB 1163 maintained the historical application of the law and
noted the bill does not eliminate pain as a consideration when reviewing a
claim for compensability.71 He added that “[n]o portion of this bill renders
pain irrelevant or unimportant” and “[n]o portion of this bill denied medical
coverage for treatment of pain in compensable conditions.”72
Greg Peterson, M.D., a Physical Medicine and Rehabilitation physician
and a Board Certified Pain Medicine Specialist, testified in support of the
bill. Dr. Peterson serves as a medical consultant for WSI and provided a
medical opinion in Mr. Mickelson’s claim.73 Dr. Peterson testified that “no
physician can reliably measure pain” and that pain can be different for
everyone.74 He explained:
[I]f the Mickelson case progresses to where a person’s report of
increased pain in a preexisting condition establishes a
compensable injury, unreliability will become prevalent in the
system. Without addressing the question of what is causing the
pain and inquiry about whether work progressed or worsened the

67.
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.

Id.
Id. at 75 (statement of Tim Wahlin, Chief of Injury Services, WSI).
Id.
Id.
Id. at 76.
Id. at 78.
Id. (written testimony of Greg Peterson, M.D.).
Id. at 98.
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condition, liability will be established without the requisite tie to
employment.75
Dr. Peterson concluded by explaining that HB 1163 was “not an issue of
medical practice,” nor did it “limit diagnosis or treatment of patients.”76 He
noted that “[t]he importance of a treating physician’s opinion is unchanged
by this bill. The treating physician’s opinion remains the paramount point
of inquiry. This bill simply allowed continued fair determination of who
should pay for patient care.”77
Patti Peterson, RN/FNP and Nora Allen, RN, both with Sanford Health,
testified in support of the bill. They supported clarifying that pain is a
symptom rather than a cause of a pre-existing condition.78
Other medical providers provided testimony in opposition to HB 1163.
The heart of their concern was the perceived elimination of pain from the
compensability equation and WSI’s alleged misunderstanding of pain.
Michael Moore, MD, a WSI’s Board of Directors member, spoke in
opposition to the bill. He contended that the bill as written could “be
interpreted as entirely dismissive of a patient's complaints of pain.”79 Dr.
Moore explained “many diagnoses are made purely on the basis of a
patient’s history, their complaints (which frequently concern pain), a
physical examination, and the judgment of the physician.”80 He posed
concern because not every diagnosis can be determined by some scan,
blood test, or imaging study.81
Dr. Moore provided suggested language to the Committee that he
purported “accomplished the goal of clarifying what constitutes a
compensable injury, but did not remove a patient's complaint of pain from
consideration.”82 This language read: “Pain that can be reasonably
attributed to the natural consequences of aging or the natural history of a
pre-existing injury, disease, or other condition is not in and of itself provide
proof of a compensable injury.”83
Michael Gonzalez, M.D., also testified in opposition to the bill. He
opined that the “proposed legislation is based on a profound
misunderstanding of what pain is” because “[i]t mixes the idea of acute pain

75.
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.

Id. at 98-99.
Id. at 99.
Id.
Id. at 101 (statement of Patti Peterson, RN and statement of Nora Allen, NP).
Id. at 102 (statement of Michael Moore, M.D., Member, WSI Board of Directors).
Id.
Id.
Id. (testimony of Michael Moore, M.D.) (on hand with the authors).
Id. at 121 (Proposed Amendment 13.0220.02002).
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with chronic pain, and does not reflect at all what we know about pain from
the contemporary scientific study.”84 He referenced a video completed by
Dr. Elliot Krane, a professor of pediatric anesthesiology and pain medicine
at Stanford University Medical School, to support his perspective. 85 In
addition, Shelley Killen, M.D., spoke in opposition to HB 1163. Her
concerns were that the bill does not consider diseases such as Complex
Regional Pain Syndrome, which is a syndrome solely based on pain.86
Finally, John Mickelson, D.O., provided written testimony indicating HB
1163 could increase the cost of treating injured workers by causing the
doctors to perform “unnecessary and expensive” tests to determine the
cause of the injury.87 He indicated “numerous diseases have no obvious
medical findings that you can perform a test on.”88
Attorney Dean Haas testified once again in opposition to HB 1163.
Mr. Haas argued that “a significant increase in pain—even chronic pain—
would no longer qualify as a compensable injury.”89 One of the main
points of his testimony was that the bill reversed the workers’ compensation
principle that employees must be taken “as is” despite age, natural aging, or
genetic susceptibility.90 He also argued that, based on the physicians who
testified earlier, pain is a significant factor in determining a person's
medical condition and it would be unethical for a physician to ignore a
person’s pain complaints.91 He agreed that pain is subjective, but noted
pain has also been studied scientifically.92 Mr. Haas contended that even
without the passage of HB 1163, North Dakota was still one of the most
conservative states when taking into consideration pre-existing conditions.93
The Senate Industry, Business, and Labor Committee reconvened on
March 26, 2013. Senator Philip Murphy moved to adopt the amendments
proposed by Dr. Moore.94 The motion failed two to five.95 However, a
similar amendment proposed by Senator Klein that intended to address
some of Dr. Moore’s concerns was also introduced.96 It provided that
84. Id. at 106 (statement of Michael Gonzalez, M.D.).
85. Dr. Elliot Krane, The Mystery of Chronic Pain, TED (Mar. 2011), http://www.ted.com/
talks/elliot_krame_the_mystery_of_chronic_pain html.
86. Senate Hearing on H.B. 1163, supra note 60, at 107 (statement of Shelly Killen, M.D.).
87. Id. at 120 (statement of John Mickelson, D.O.).
88. Id.
89. Id. at 108 (statement of Attorney Dean Haas).
90. Id.
91. Id. at 109.
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. Id. at 25 (statement of Sen. Philip Murphy).
95. Id. at 31.
96. Id. at 26 (statement of Sen. Jerry Klein).
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“[p]ain is a symptom and may be considered in determining whether there
is a substantial acceleration or substantial worsening of a preexisting injury,
disease, or other condition, but pain alone is not a substantial acceleration
or a substantial worsening.”97 Mr. Wahlin explained this amendment
helped clarify for everyone that pain is a factor when considering
compensability of an injury, but pain alone will not be considered a
substantial worsening, but a symptom.98 The amendment passed the
committee seven to zero.99 Ultimately the amended bill passed the
Committee by a vote of five to two.100
On March 29, 2013, the Senate passed HB 1163 with Senate
Amendments, twenty-seven in favor and nineteen in opposition.101 Because
of the Senate’s amendment to the bill, it was returned to the House of
Representatives to consider the engrossed version of the bill. On April 4,
2013, the House of Representatives refused to concur with the Senate's
amendments and referred it back to the House Industry, Business, and
Labor Committee.102
On April 10, 2013, a conference committee on HB 1163 was held with
appointed members from the Senate and House Industry, Business, and
Labor Committees in attendance. House members posed concern with the
Senate amendments being redundant, contradictory, and providing
additional language for courts to interpret.103 Senator John Andrist
explained that the Senate amendment was crafted to assist in the passage of
the bill given the contention during the Senate hearings.104 Tim Wahlin
stated it was WSI's intention from the beginning that pain be considered,
and pointed to the fact that the Senate amendment acknowledges that pain
is a symptom to be considered, but WSI will still look at what is the basis or
condition that is substantially worsened.105 The conference committee
ultimately agreed to accede to the Senate amendments.106 On April 16,
2013, the House of Representatives passed House Bill 1163 with Senate
Amendments—sixty-five to twenty-eight.107 On April 29, 2013, Governor
97. Id. at 123.
98. Id. at 26 (statement of Tim Wahlin, Chief of Injury Services, WSI).
99. Id. at 32.
100. Id. at 33.
101. S. JOURNAL, 63d Leg. Assemb., Reg. Sess. 931, 932 (N.D. 2013).
102. H. JOURNAL, 63d Leg. Assemb., Reg. Sess. 1141, 1148 (N.D. 2013).
103. Hearing on H.B. 1163 Before the Conf. Comm. on Indus., Bus., and Labor, 63rd Leg.,
Assemb., Reg. Sess. 36 (N.D. 2013) (statements of Representatives George Keiser and Dan
Ruby).
104. Id. at 38 (statement of Senator John Andrist).
105. Id. (statement of Tim Wahlin, Chief of Injury Services, WSI).
106. Id. at 39.
107. H. JOURNAL, 63d Leg. Assemb., Reg. Sess. 1529, 1535 (N.D. 2013).
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Dalrymple signed House Bill 1163. It applied to all claims regardless of the
date of injury and would become effective August 1, 2013.108
D. CASE LAW FOLLOWING MICKELSON AND THE INTERPRETATION OF
THE 2013 LEGISLATIVE CLARIFICATIONS
On July 18, 2013, the Supreme Court issued a unanimous decision in
Davenport v. Workforce Safety and Insurance Fund.109 This is the first case
following Mickelson in which the Court provided additional insight
regarding its decision in Mickelson. The main issue in this case was
whether Mr. Davenport incurred compensable injuries under section 65-0102(10) of the Century Code Code.110 Davenport asserted that, although he
had known preexisting degenerative spine and lower back conditions, his
work injuries substantially aggravated or worsened his conditions to where
he had to seek medical treatment and was unable to perform his regular
work duties.111 He asserted “his ongoing chronic pain condition was
substantially caused by his work injuries.”112 Relying on Mickelson,
Davenport advocated for reversal of the order denying compensability for
these conditions.113
WSI responded that the ALJ correctly decided Davenport’s preexisting
cervical spine, left shoulder, and lower back conditions were not
compensable. WSI asserted the Mickelson case involved significantly
different facts and did not require reversal of the ALJ’s decision because it
involved a latent preexisting condition while Davenport had known
preexisting symptoms in his cervical spine and back.114 WSI maintained
the ALJ correctly applied the law and the ALJ’s findings were supported by
the weight of the evidence because Davenport's preexisting condition in his
lower back and cervical spine was hastened by years of smoking, and he
offered no medical evidence supported by objective medical findings to
show compensability for a work injury.115
In its analysis, the Supreme Court provided further clarification
regarding Mickelson's meaning:

108. North Dakota Legislative Council, Effective Dates of 2013 Legislation, available at
http://www.legis nd.gov/files/resource/63-2013/effective-dates-legislation/2013-effective-dateslegislation.pdf?20140417101022.
109. Davenport v. Workforce Safety & Ins. Fund, 2013 ND 118, 833 N.W.2d 500.
110. Id. ¶ 1, 833 N.W.2d at 503.
111. Id. ¶ 20, 833 N.W.2d at 509.
112. Id. ¶ 20, 833 N.W.2d at 509.
113. Id. ¶ 20, 833 N.W.2d at 509.
114. Id. ¶ 21, 833 N.W.2d at 509.
115. Id. ¶ 21, 833 N.W.2d at 509.
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Under Mickelson, depending on the specific facts and
circumstances and the medical evidence supported by objective
medical findings, pain can be a substantial worsening of the
severity or a substantial acceleration of the progression of a
preexisting condition and pain also can be a symptom of the
condition triggered by employment. Under Mickelson, however,
pain alone does not establish a substantial acceleration or a
substantial worsening of a preexisting condition for purposes of a
compensable injury. Rather, Mickelson does not eliminate the
requirement that there must be medical evidence supported by
objective medical findings for a compensable injury.116
Thus, in the Davenport case, there was sufficient medical evidence to
support the conclusion that Davenport’s pain was not caused by the work
injury, and likely would have progressed the same, absent the work injury.
The Court emphasized that just because pain became worse after the injury,
the requisite objective medical evidence still needed to be present to support
a causal connection between the pain in the underlying condition and the
work incident. The mere existence of increased pain is not enough to deem
the pain compensable.
Most recently, the Court issued a split decision in Warren Parsons v.
Workforce Safety and Insurance Fund.117 In this case, the ALJ denied
Parson's claim for benefits on the basis that the work injury triggered
symptoms in his preexisting cervical spine condition, but did not
substantially accelerate the progression or substantially worsen the severity
of his preexisting condition as required by section 65-01-10(b)(7) of the
Century Code Code.118 Writing for the majority, Justice Maring determined
the preexisting injury statute was not applicable to this claim and that ALJ
erred as a matter of law in applying it.119
In addition, according to the majority, the medical evidence supported
that Parson’s condition, for which he was seeking treatment, did not stem
from his preexisting condition, but from separate unrelated tears in his
cervical spine discs caused by the work injury.120 As a result, the majority
reversed the denial of Parson's claim concluding, “a reasoning mind could
not reasonably determine the ALJ’s findings that Parson’s injuries are
attributable to his preexisting condition and that his employment triggered

116.
117.
118.
119.
120.

Id. ¶ 25, 833 N.W.2d at 510 (citations omitted).
2013 ND 235, 841 N.W.2d 404.
Id. ¶ 16, 841 N.W.2d at 409.
Id. ¶ 19, 841 N.W.2d at 410.
Id. ¶ 21, 841 N.W.2d at 411.
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symptoms of his preexisting condition were proven by a the weight of the
evidence,” and remanded the case to WSI to adjudicate benefits.121
Justice Crothers dissented. He determined the ALJ correctly applied
the law, and the ALJ’s factual determinations should have been
sustained.122 The dissent was critical of the majority overstepping its
bounds: “[t]he majority notes, but I believe does not abide by, our very
limited review of an executive branch agency’s factual determinations.”123
The dissent explained the ALJ considered and weighed the evidence, and
the ALJ’s findings were supported by competent evidence.124 “On that
basis, I would affirm the ALJ’s decisions under our limited legal authority
to review factual findings.”125 Ultimately, Parsons does not modify the
plurality’s decision in Mickelson.
The Parsons’ majority simply
determined under the evidence presented in Parsons’ claim that the
preexisting injury statute was not applicable and the factual determinations
were not supported.
There are likely other cases currently in the appeal process that will
shed light on the boundaries of the Mickelson decision. However, like
Davenport and Parsons, these cases will interpret the pre-2013 preexisting
injury statute. Until the court addresses the 2013 version of this statute, it
will not be known whether the court and the Legislature will interpret this
provision consistently. In the meantime, WSI will continue to apply the
2013 version of the preexisting injury statute to compensability
determinations made after August 1, 2013.
III. CONCLUSION
At the core of this debate is the time worn conflict that exists between
the judiciary and the legislative branches of government in the area of
workers’ compensation. The conflict makes this area of law difficult to
project for regulators. Historically, the great compromise that removed an
employee's right to sue in return for the sure and certain relief of no-fault
medical and wage replacement benefits has always been ripe for judicial
interpretations consistent with an overlay of interpretive justice.
Legislatively, especially in North Dakota, political forces are fiercely
invested in controlling this arena by statute.

121.
122.
123.
124.
125.

Id. ¶¶ 21-22, 841 N.W.2d at 411-12.
Id. ¶ 32, 841 N.W.2d at 413 (Crothers, J. dissenting).
Id. ¶ 34, 841 N.W.2d at 415.
Id. ¶¶ 36-37, 841 N.W.2d at 415-16.
Id. ¶ 37, 841 N.W.2d at 416.
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In North Dakota, a schism has begun to appear within our Supreme
Court between a faction tending towards a progressive activism within the
workers' compensation laws and a very disciplined, literalistic reading of
the statutory scheme. This interplay has appeared in the Mickelson case,
and was recently affirmed in the Parsons case. Both the plurality and later
majority opinions were authored by Justice Maring, the dissents by Justice
Crothers. In his dissents, Justice Crothers is critical of the court's ease of
avoiding, or aggressive interpretation of statutory law.
As the state agency whose charge it is to enforce the law, little variance
is allowed other than applying the statutes as written. The position is
essential because WSI is required to act as an insurer and “reserve”
appropriate funds for the payment of claims currently in the system. Based
upon those anticipated expenditures, rates are developed to charge
employers appropriate premiums to cover the anticipated costs. If
interpretations of the statutes vary, costs will as well. Having already
charged premiums developed by an interpretation gleaned from
participation in the legislative process, it leaves WSI in the unenviable
position of charging current employers for those changes, even when those
employers are outside of the risk years insured.
This debate is far from over. Recent changes in the make up of the
court may also alter the outcomes of workers’ compensation cases in the
years to come. We will wait and see.

